UKRAINE: ONE YEAR AFTER THE ALL-OUT INVASION

Parliamentary Briefing Ukraine Solidarity Campaign

Content

Summary: The Military Situation and Possibilities
The War and The Economy of Ukraine
Workers’ Rights and Labour Law
The Losses Of Ukrainian Economy And Society
Appendix 1 Tanks and Military Aid for Ukraine EDM
Appendix 2 Stand with Ukraine – UK Solidarity Statement

For further information:

Email: ukrainesolidaritycampaign@gmail.com

Web: ukrainesolidaritycampaign.org

SUMMARY: THE MILITARY SITUATION AND POSSIBILITIES

In the aftermath of the invasion, Russia controlled 24% of Ukraine’s territory. Today, thanks to two major counter-offensives, that control is reduced to 16%. namely:

Parts of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (aka the Donbas)
The Sea of Azov coastline up to the River Dnipro
Crimea.

Russia lost the initiative early on (March-May) because it under-estimated the extent of Ukrainian popular resistance, and of Western sanctions, arms and financial support for Ukraine. And because a social system based on disinformation and propaganda seriously weakened the ability of military commanders to operate in a fact-based environment. Many reports – of readiness, position, achievements etc – turned out to be lies.

The byproduct of military failure was the widespread and systematic use of torture, sexual violence, executions and deportations. These were not due to indiscipline. Rather, experts assess, it was an army that thought it would be dealing with a few “terrorist” resistance fighters using such counter-insurgency techniques against an entire population.

Nevertheless, a Russian victory is possible. Putin’s strategy consists of four objectives:

destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, in order to undermine the population’s will to resist.
destroy Western unity through energy inflation and the techniques of so-called New Generation Warfare (disinformation, electoral manipulation, destabilisation of Western democracies).
- This month that effort has focused on an attempted coup in Moldova.
sap Ukraine’s ability to fight through concentrated battles of attrition (as currently around the town of Bakhmut)
threaten nuclear retaliation every time Ukrainian counter-offensives take back territory (which he claims is Russian territory).

For Russia, “winning” need not mean conquering more territory, but simply holding on to what has been seized, while destabilising Ukraine and the West.

Labour has supported the UK government’s supply of arms, ammunition, training etc. It is likely, though not confirmed, that the USA has provided Ukraine (on and off) with targeting intelligence, enabling the use of long-range artillery (HIMARS and precision guided shells) and anti-ship missiles. However, at no stage has the Ukrainian command been integrated with, or closely guided by, the Western militaries.

Labour is calling for the UK Government to place support for Ukraine on a systematic basis, placing orders for weapons and ammunition with UK firms, and bringing the supply chain to levels required for intensive conflict.

At each stage Ukraine has met Western supply of heavy weapons with demands for more powerful capabilities. This strategy was forced on Zelensky by the demands of Germany and France for a primarily defensive response from the West – i.e. ensuring Russia could not win, but neither could Ukraine.

Western tanks will be a powerful addition to Ukraine’s armed forces, once delivered, with crews trained and supplies of ammunition, maintenance workshops etc. This is because, unlike Russian built tanks, they are built for defence and survival on the battlefield.

However, the demand for tanks, combat aircraft etc is really about the provision of military systems: ie the combination of weapons, sensors and logistics needed to mount mechanised offensive warfare of the kind that would allow Ukraine to break through Russian-held positions and retake territory.

Why is there opposition to greater supply of UK tanks:

Britain has just 227 Challenger tanks. 148 are being upgraded for use by the British army. 14 have been donated to Ukraine. The context of this is a disagreement inside the MoD and Tory party about the size of the British army. There are factions arguing for the UK to leave land warfare to Poland, Finland and Ukraine, with the UK specialising in maritime, air, cyber etc.

Those who oppose that fear giving up more tanks, because in current fiscal conditions the army may never get any more.

What to expect in 2023:

It is likely that Russia will be mounting its own spring offensive. It has called up 300,000 reservists and reordered its high command in preparation for this.

It has prepared this by getting its Western sympathisers to mount a co-ordinated call for “ceasefire and negotiations”, alleging that the West, and UK Government in particular, has a strategy of sabotaging such negotiations. However, Putin has made no offer of negotiations and will not do so. No matter how well-intentioned such calls are, those making them run the risk of falling victim to Russian hybrid war techniques.

The record of eight years of proxy Russian occupation of Donbas/Crimea, with the associated repression of human rights advocates, trade unions and ethnic minorities, shows that there will be no peace in Ukraine – let alone social justice – until Putin is defeated militarily.

It is likely that Spring 2023 will therefore see movement on the front lines in both directions, and possibly a return to the nuclear threats of September 2022 should Putin lose significant ground.

THE WAR AND THE ECONOMY OF UKRAINE

Russia’s invasion has plunged Ukraine’s into a deep economic crisis. The country’s GDP contracted in 2022 by a third; consumer inflation stood at around 26%; the currency has devalued by a third.

To finance the war effort, most state expenditure not tied to war fighting itself, has been cut in the 2023 budget, gravely affecting welfare, education, and healthcare expenditure.

There is a gaping £31 billion hole in the budget that Ukraine needs help of its Western partners to close. The effects are being felt on the ground: railway workers in central Ukraine, to whom Sotsialny Rukh (Social Movement) deliver aid, have had their nominal take-home pay nearly halved. So have most public employees.

Around “half of firms have reported cutting nominal wages (in some cases by 50%) and operating reduced hours since the start of the war” (Cooper 2022: 6). Jobs have been cut too, more than trebling the official unemployment rate compared to 2021: at the end of October 2022, the National Bank of Ukraine estimated an overall unemployment rate of 28.3%.

In agriculture, one sector where the impact of Russia’s occupation and maritime blockade has been felt particularly strongly, government investment into new rail, river and maritime transport infrastructure have slowed the decline of exports, while rising global food prices limited the damage. However, within the country, access to this transportation infrastructure and export opportunities remains highly unequal. Large agribusinesses have seen their losses limited by these new initiatives, while the smallholder farmers are practically unable to transport their produce to markets, in some cases leading to local food price drops that undercut their ability to buy seed for the new season.

Poverty is the immediate result of the profound social upheaval wrought by the war. As of September last year, “more than 1 in 2 Ukrainians reported needing emergency financial support to pay for basic necessities like food, healthcare and utility bills” (Cooper 2022: 7).

Of all social groups, the internally displaced have been hit particularly hard. In August last year, the International Organization for Migration found that 38% of them were either unemployed or not looking for work. Those who lost their homes and were displaced to Ukraine’s safer western regions, are facing a doubling, and sometimes near trebling, of average rents.

Ukraine’s capacity to win the war and achieve a lasting peace rest on social peace in the rear. For this, the country urgently needs support to finance its basic services and pay salaries to state employees. This help should come in the form of unconditional grants shoring up current expenditure rather than loans. Ukraine’s debt payments have been frozen, but this is not enough: the debt should be cancelled. Seized Russian assets should be liquidated to pay for reconstruction and supporting Ukraine’s war effort.

Fundamentally, however, British and allied aid should be directed to creating economic opportunities for ordinary people — for instance, supporting the access of smallholding farmers, who are the pillars of the rural economy, to national and export markets.

As documented in recent reports, Ukraine’s government is poised to organise its war effort on neoliberal principles of deregulation, privatisation, and the small state. This experimentation with a “free market war economy” is dangerous not only because it risks further undermining Ukraine’s capacity to finance the war, but also because it threatens stability in the rear; and Russia will use any opportunity to destabilise Ukraine to achieve its goals.

As a minimum, British international aid, which flows to consultants advising the Ukrainian government and witting policy documents, must not support further hollowing out of the Ukrainian state. Further, the aid should be directed towards shoring up the public sector and encouraging economic recovery of businesses and industries that can support the local population and create a tax base for a strong war economy. Ukraine and its people need a strong state, and Britain must support this.

WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND LABOUR LAW

Today, Ukrainian workers are bravely defending their country, homes, workplaces and way of life, with consequences for peace, security, economic stability and way of life of all workers in Europe.

While their sacrifice as soldiers is recognised and glorified, their dignity as workers is being undermined by the recent changes in Ukraine’s labour legislation. In particular, the new Law 5371, according to which people working at firms and organisations with fewer than 250 employees will now be covered by individual contracts negotiated with employers, rather than the national labour code.

Giving primacy to flexibilization and zero-hours contracts, the law strips around 70% of Ukraine’s workers of many protections and benefits of collective agreements negotiated by unions (such as salaries, holidays, pensions, and benefits), while in those instances where trade unions operate removing their legal authority over a number of employment areas, including in relation to dismissals.

The majority of Ukrainian MPs see Law 5371 as part of a fight against “extreme over-regulation of employment contradicts, the principles of market self-regulation [and] modern personnel management”. It is presented as part of a curtailment of “red tape” around employment laws which “creates bureaucratic barriers both for the self-realisation of employees and for raising the competitiveness of employers”. Part of the explanation for the introduction of the new law has been the need for post-war reconstruction, including to attract foreign direct investment. The other part has been based on the mistaken view that the change is needed as part of the drive to join the EU and transpose Ukraine’s legislation to that of the Union.

While the government has used the pretext of wanting to “alleviate the difficulties faced by companies in wartime”, it is known that this new law, as part of wider plans to change Ukraine’s Labour Code and related social policy legislation, has been in the works for a number of years, and that the law was slated for proposal first time around in 2021, but was later shelved. What is more distressing is the information that the UK government has played a central role in preparing and promoting the legal changes. Indeed, since September 2020, the British Foreign Office has advised the Ukrainian Ministry of the Economy through a UK-funded project aimed at “transforming the economy”, which includes a large section on changes to labour law.

Both of Ukraine’s trade union confederations (FPU and KVPU), various global union federations and national and supranational confederations (ETUC, ITUC and ILO) have criticised this law and the direction of labour reforms in Ukraine in the last two years. The question today, in the face of widespread criticism from workers’ institutions and looking at the harmful effect of the reforms in Ukraine given the sacrifices made by Ukrainian workers today, is what the UK, European and North American governments and other political actors are prepared to do to stop or reverse the changes in labour legislation (some of which follow their advice) and help to defend Ukraine’s workers as Ukraine’s workers today effectively defend the freedom and peace of millions. Work towards this has to start today because it is both just and pre-empts social conflict in post-war Ukraine.

THE LOSSES OF UKRAINIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

On February 24, 2022, when Russia yet again invaded Ukraine, it was already one of the poorest and most indebted countries in Europe, at war since 2014. Its needs and losses have grown exponentially – dislocation of the labour force, infrastructure destruction, ecological damage, etc.

Economic and social losses to date

The full scale of losses is unknown due to the ongoing shelling and impossibility to conduct calculations with any degree of precision in the frontline areas, let alone those temporarily occupied. Only upon the full withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine’s constitutional borders will it be possible to make such assessments; even then arguably most valuable losses will be impossible to assess – value of lives lost, futures ruined, childhoods stolen, bodies and minds injured, homes and heirlooms forever lost, and ecocidal damage done to humans and nature of today and tomorrow.

Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine “estimated US$46 billion and still rising—includes direct war damage to air, forests, soil and water; remnants and pollution from the use of weapons and military equipment; and contamination from the shelling of thousands of facilities holding toxic and hazardous materials”,[1] the long term impact of losses to and of the ecosystems is impossible to quantify especially since Ukraine “contains habitats that are home to 35% of Europe’s biodiversity, including 70,000 plant and animal species, many of them rare, relict, and endemic”.[2]

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 OHCHR estimates “the total number of conflict-related casualties in Ukraine from 14 April 2014 to 31 Dec 2021 to be 51,000–54,0008: 14,200-14,400 killed (at least 3,404 civilians, estimated 4,400 Ukrainian forces, and estimated 6,500 members of armed groups), and 37-39,000 injured (7,000–9,000 civilians, 13,800–14,200, Ukrainian forces and 15,800-16,200 members of armed groups).[3]

From 24 February 2022 to 12 February 2023, “the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded 18,955 civilian casualties in the country: 7,199 killed and 11,756 injured.

This included:

a total of 7,199 killed (2,888 men, 1,941 women, 226 boys , and 180 girls, as well as 32 children and 1,932 adults whose sex is not yet known)
a total of 11,756 injured (2,616 men, 1,856 women, 341 boys, and 253 girls, as well as 260 children and 6,430 adults whose sex is not yet known)
- In Donetsk and Luhansk regions: 10,167 casualties (4,189 killed and 5,978 injured)
  - On Government-controlled territory: 7,946 casualties (3,679 killed and 4,267 injured)
  - On territory controlled by Russian armed forces and affiliated armed groups: 2,221 casualties (510 killed and 1,711 injured)”[4]

Ukraine does not publish the numbers of those lost in combat.

The efforts of healthcare sector workers and volunteers alike cannot be overestimated.

Still, in 2022, UNOCHA reported that of 4.3bn emergency humanitarian funding needed/pledged by various countries, 3.4bn or 80% were raised.

Bilateral assistance of USA, EU, UK, and other states plays a vital role as do direct individual donations – some $1bn was collected via 20 largest foundations e.g., Prytula, United24, and Come Back Alive funds.[5]

Generosity is overwhelming, yet it peters out already, as declining donations indicates. Ukraine will need reliable sources of funds.

Healthcare system reforms launched in 2017 tried to fix the problems lingering from the USSR system days and aggravated by commercialisation, underfunding, and poor pharmaceutical sector regulation (esp quality and prices), yet led to inadequate regionalised provision and uneven care access that all came out in the wash of COVID-19 pandemic mismanagement and, now, war.[6]

Given a difficult macroeconomic situation and massive spending on defence, Ukraine needs external aid of roughly $4 billion per month to support the war effort and sustain essential public services.

The Ukrainian government has put the need for budgetary support for 2023 at $38 billion.[7] The damage is so severe that even the usual advocates of market solutions to market and non-market problems call for some unconventional for them measures.

***

By the end of 2022, the total amount of documented damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure was estimated at $137.8 billion (at replacement cost).^[8] Since autumn 2022, all thermal and hydropower stations have been damaged, by February about a third of all power generation and distribution capacity is lost; “at least twice during these attacks, Ukrainian nuclear power plants lost connection to the grid, posing nuclear safety risks”.[9]

Now Russia is draining Kahovka water reservoir which is used to cool the largest nuclear plant in Europe, Zaporizhzhia, putting its safety at risk and compromising the functioning of the adjacent hydropower plant.[10]

Being a major global grain exporter, the loss of 40% of production in 2022[11] is and will be felt in Ukraine and abroad, especially in low-income countries.

In the early days of the invasion in 2022 “Russia must pay” project was launched to document war damages upon Ukrainian economy; the results and analysis are published on damaged.in.ua website and are updated regularly.^[12]

***

It is hard to be precise about the social losses and damages too, not unlike economic albeit for different reasons.

According to the recent International Organisation for Migration report, as of 23 January, “5.4 million IDPs are displaced across Ukraine. This represents a decrease compared to 5.9M as of 5 December 2022.

The estimated number of IDPs in Ukraine has been steadily declining since August 2022”; amongst those “58% of all IDPs have been displaced for six months or more. However, the crisis remains dynamic with 12 per cent of IDPs (equivalent to 640,000 people) becoming displaced in the past two months”.[13]

According to the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, there were 8,054,405 refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe as of Feb 7, 2023, of which 4,830,738 were refugees from Ukraine registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe.

According to the Ombudsman Lubinets office, some hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian children were forcibly taken to Russia while accurate information about them, their location, names, and their numbers are unknown.[14] So far, identity of only 13,000 of those children is established.[15]

Debt politics amidst socio-economic upheaval and erosion of sovereignty

Chaotic borrowing and debt explosion in Ukraine over the years was partly a result of oligarchic state capture and kleptocracy.

IFI loans were issued under conditions of social spending cuts, economising on vital needs and funding key parts of the economy. The country’s debt demand context was characterised by the loss of a real economic base at a rate disproportionate to the growth required to maintain the health of the economy or honour debts, state or private. Thus, as a result, a double squeeze on the economy was produced due to the ongoing need for loaned capital (state, commercial and consumer), complicated by the inability to repay even the interest.

Debt increased up to 5 times denominated in UAH due to, among other, dollarisation, Euroization, and high value-added goods import dependency. Until the summer 2022 Ukraine adhered to its debt obligations.

Between February 24 to October 2, 2022, “the amount of funds paid by the government for the repayment of domestic debt instruments by UAH 54,093.9 million exceeds the amount of funds raised in the state budget at auctions for the sale of government domestic loan bonds”.[16] Clearly an alternative from of financing is needed and it must come in a form of grants, not more loans concealed as aid.

A temporary suspension of debt servicing has been agreed between Ukraine, The Paris Club and G7 on July 20, 2022, and signed on Sept 14, 2022, for 1 year as of Aug 1, 2022, with a possible extension for one more year (decision affecting about 75% of all foreign debt)[17] – a glowing result of multipartite international civil society campaigning.[18] Yet this is insufficient; not least since IMF debt conditionality is firmly in place and debt surcharges are still to be paid.[19]

Lugano Principles: whither recovery?

In Lugano, Switzerland on July 4-5, 2022, the Ukraine Recovery Conference URC2022 was co-hosted by the Governments of Switzerland and Ukraine.

Discussion revolved around the (1) institutional architecture for smart recovery, recovery of infrastructure (2), economy (3), environment (4), and society (5).

Seven principles on which the above are to rest were agreed and reflected in the document agreed to be treated as “live” and evolving: (1) Partnership, (2) Reform focus, (3) Transparency, accountability, and rule of law, (4) Democratic participation, (5) Multistakeholder engagement, (6) Gender equality and inclusion, and (7) Sustainability.[20]

The above sounds promising yet upon deeper examination it appears the aims will be hard to achieve with the means chosen i.e. the state will struggle to finance or attract enough private investment/direct it where it is most needed – the whole of $750 billion of it so far[21] (I will leave governance structures aside due to space limitations of this chapter).

At the same time, the State Property Fund of Ukraine [22] has largely become an auction platform selling off to the highest bidder the remaining and often mismanaged state property instead of investing in it. The last nearly 9 years of war and global pandemic/economic slowdown significantly undermined Ukraine’s investment attractiveness and devalued its currency, the sale of assets generate little value for the state budget. Moreover, wouldn’t passing those objects into ownership of local communities/employees and making cheap financing available to them be a more reasonable and economically beneficial option?

Reconstruction plan and EU prospects – what can make it a success?

A lot of discussion about the reconstruction plan revolves around it being modelled on Marshall Plan. A like plan for Ukraine would need to be (re)designed and executed in alignment with the best practice and standards of EU labour rights, public services and environmental protection; for that to happen a number of changes need to occur.

Ukraine’s extraordinary situation presents a case for large-scale multi-faceted international assistance, state (and household) debt cancellation, and conditionality rewriting to facilitate “fiscal activism” i.e., measures aimed at stabilising business cycles via discretionary use of fiscal policy.

Austerity that Ukraine is practicing for neoliberal economic thinking that took root among its politicians and basic lack of funds – wartime or not – is uneconomical and unecological; what’s needed is full state-funded redevelopment and financing of public services and care economy.

The state in Ukraine, unlike its stereotypical perception, is not bloated, but on the contrary – “the share of national income distributed through taxation and budgetary allocation in Ukraine is much smaller than in advanced economies of the EU”.[23]

State was the key agent in rebuilding much of Europe, Japan and South Korea after World War II – the “development state” was elaborated as a concept, and now is the time to return to it as “free” markets failed. Principles of the European Green Deal and beyond with state at the centre of recovery is what is needed.

IMF and other creditors are needed as sources of financing. But it is state institutions that carry out the recovery and should have “the ownership of the reconstruction process”.[24] Moreover, the key role of civil society (NGOs and trade unions) delivering where state and markets alike failed since 2014 must be acknowledged, scaffolded, and financed by the state instead of international crowd-funders.

Ukraine will need green/low carbon job creation (e.g., care economy, arts, education, environmental preservation & sustainable R&D, etc.), just transition, and energy democracy which will maximise possibilities for its economic self-sufficiency and reduce import dependency of key industries.

Job creation is key as millions of Ukrainians work abroad seasonally, more now have left the country etc – by 2017 7-9 million left the country to work abroad, 3.3 million between 2011-21 alone, “while their families remained in Ukraine. The inflow of remittances to Ukraine in 2020 reached $12.1 billion”.[25]

EU integration can become a saving grace for Ukraine’s economy or it can become a force for further de-development and peripherilisation.

Lessons from experiences of other economically weaker and newer member states here is key and it has been observed that integration processes are a “game that has long been rigged against all the countries of the periphery.”[26]

Justice for War Crimes

There can be absolutely no doubt that war crimes have been committed. The International Criminal Court is investigating and supporting the Ukrainian Government in this process. However this is only one of the processes that can be pursued.

The Ukrainian government and other European Governments have called for the establishment of an International Tribunal to be established as happened with Nuremburg. It was the Soviet authorities who demanded that the Nazi leadership be tried for the offence of Crimes against Peace which we now know as the Crime of Aggression.

The UK Government should now give unequivocal support to the establishment of a such a Tribunal which would enable the Russian leadership and key instigators to be put on trial.

The UK Government now needs to assess all the assets seized or frozen as a consequence of sanctions against Russia and key Russian citizens. Steps now need to be taken, legal or otherwise to enable these assets to be allocated for reparations and reconstruction and for the support of the Ukrainian government in defending its territory.

Authors of the Ukraine Solidarity Campaign Parliamentary Briefing:

Paul Mason author and journalist

Taras Fedirko, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow,

Dr Gregory Schwartz, School of Management, University of Bristol

Yuliya Yurchenko, Senior Lecturer in Political Economy University of Greenwich
Mick Antoniw Member of the Parliament of Wales

APPENDIX 1

Tanks and Military Aid for Ukraine

EDM (Early Day Motion)808: tabled on 30 January 2023

That this House notes that 24 February marks the first anniversary of Russia launching an all-out invasion of Ukraine; applauds the Ukrainian people’s courageous resistance; welcomes the gifting of a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine and the transfer of Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine; recognises that increased assistance must be provided to help Ukraine successfully conclude the war, free their entire country, and secure a just peace; condemns the fact that 1,105 vehicles were disposed of by the MOD via sale/auction in 2022 for financial gain; calls for all such equipment to be offered to Ukraine; notes that the Challenger 3 programme will upgrade at least 148 of the existing Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks, and calls for the urgent gifting of 79 CR2 tanks to Ukraine; notes that the 170 CVR(T) Scimitar vehicles go out of service this year, and calls for their gifting to Ukraine; notes with the arrival of 623 Boxer vehicles that the Warrior Vehicle is being retired, and calls for all Warriors to be gifted to Ukraine; notes that only four Typhoon Tranche 1 aircraft will be retained until 2027, and calls for the gifting of the remaining Typhoon Tranche 1 aircraft to Ukraine; calls for those of the current fleet of 60 Chinooks due for retirement be gifted to Ukraine; and calls on the Secretary of State for Defence to commit to the above aid being provided urgently with necessary training and ammunition, and for delivery no later than Spring 2023.

APPENDIX 2

Stand with Ukraine – UK solidarity statement and call for protests for the anniversary of Russia’s invasion

We are calling for and supporting protests, actions and meetings in solidarity with Ukraine in the last week of February – during the global week of action organised by the European Network for Solidarity with Ukraine and others, marking the anniversary of Russia’s invasion.

The casualties of Russia’s war in Ukraine are counted in tens of thousands, the displaced in many millions, the damage in tens of billions of pounds. The invading forces are systematically committing crimes including intentional killing of civilians, rape, destruction of vital infrastructure, and forced displacement and deportations, including of children. Meanwhile the war is transforming Putin’s Russia into an even more violently reactionary and authoritarian regime.

A democratic, lasting peace for the peoples of Ukraine and Russia requires the defeat of Russia’s brutal imperialism. We stand with Ukraine’s military resistance to Putin’s war, and with the anti-war resistance in Russia.

We demand the immediate withdrawal of all invading troops from the territory of Ukraine to its internationally recognised borders; the right for all refugees and displaced persons to return in conditions of safety; for those responsible for war crimes to be held fully accountable, and for meaningful justice for their victims.

We demand governments increase humanitarian aid, and for the gifting to Ukraine of all the surplus UK military equipment due to be replaced, especially the 79 Challenger tanks, 170 Scimitar reconnaissance vehicles, all Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, Typhoon fighter aircraft – to help Ukraine win more quickly, with less suffering.

We commit to building renewed and expanded solidarity with Ukraine’s resistance; with Ukraine’s labour movement and left in their fight for independence, to defend workers’ rights, human rights and democracy during the war, and for a more just and democratic post-war reconstruction; and with the anti-war movement and independent labour organisations in Russia.

We call for the UK to increase its support and welcome for the victims of this conflict, and to end the hostile environment facing refugees.

Initial Signatories

Gary Smith, GMB General Secretary

Barbara Plant, GMB President

Mick Whelan, ASLEF General Secretary

Chris Kitchen, NUM General Secretary

Simon Weller, ASLEF Assistant General Secretary

John Moloney, PCS Assistant General Secretary (pc)

Oksana Holota, Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine (in UK)

Pavlo Holota, Independent Union of Mineworkers of Ukraine (in UK)

John McDonnell MP

Nadia Whittome MP

Clive Lewis MP

Rachael Maskell MP

Lloyd Russell-Moyle MP

Ian Lavery MP

Mick Antoniw, Member of the Senedd

Paul Sweeney, Member of the Scottish Parliament

Alena Ivanova, Sacha Ismail, Chris Ford, Ukraine Solidarity Campaign

Paul Mason, writer and campaigner

Peter Tatchell, human rights campaigner

Yuliya Yurchenko, Sotsialnyi Rukh, Ukraine Solidarity Campaign, UCU activist

[1] https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2023/environmental-accountability-justice-and-reconstruction-russian-war-ukraine

[2] https://wwfcee.org/our-offices/ukraine/assessing-the-environmental-impacts-of-the-war-in-ukraine

[3] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Conflict-related%20civilian%20casualties%20as%20of%2031%20December%202021%20%28rev%2027%20January%202022%29%20corr%20EN_0.pdf

[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/02/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-13-february-2023

[5] https://forbes.ua/news/ukraintsi-ta-inozemtsi-zadonatili-mayzhe-1-mlrd-u-naybilshi-fondi-z-pochatku-viyni-23012023-11234

[6] https://commons.com.ua/en/yevrointegraciya-ta-ohorona-zdorovya-v-ukrayini/

[7][7] (e.g., Becker et al. 2022)

[8] At the time of writing, the listed are the most up-to-date figures. https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/the-total-amount-of-damage-caused-to-ukraine-s-infrastructure-due-to-the-war-has-increased-to-almost-138-billion/

[9] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraine-quarterly-digest-october-december-2022

[10] https://www.npr.org/2023/02/10/1155761686/russia-is-draining-a-massive-ukrainian-reservoir-endangering-a-nuclear-plant

[11] (FAO 2023: 1) https://www.fao.org/3/cc3385en/cc3385en.pdf

[12] “The assessment is the result of the joint work of the KSE Institute, government bodies under the leadership of the Ministry of Reintegration, the Ministry of Regions and the Ministry of Infrastructure in cooperation with other ministries and partner organizations within the framework of the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of War”. The scope of damage is analysed by KSE Institute analysts and volunteers from partner organizations: Center for Economic Strategy, Dragon Capital, Anti-Corruption Headquarters, Institute of Analytics and Advocacy, Transparency International Ukraine, Prozorro.Prodazhi, Prozorro, Ukrainian Council of Shopping Centers, CoST Ukraine, Vkursi Agro, TVIS Ukraine and the Association of Retailers of Ukraine. At: damaged.in.ua

[13] https://dtm.iom.int/reports/ukraine-internal-displacement-report-general-population-survey-round-12-16-23-january-2023?close=true

[14] https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3639037-ombudsman-hundreds-of-thousands-of-ukrainian-children-could-be-deported-to-russia.html

[15] https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine

[16] https://ukranews.com/en/news/885992-payments-on-government-bond-repayments-since-beginning-of-war-exceed-borrowing-by-uah-54-1-billion

[17] https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/ukraina-pidpysala-memorandum-pro-vzaiemorozuminnia-shchodo-pryzupynennia-vyplat-za-ofitsiinym-borhom-z-mizhnarodnymy-partneramy-u-g7-ta-paryzkomu-klubi

[18] https://debtjustice.org.uk/press-release/ukraine-to-suspend-foreign-debt-repayments; https://rev.org.ua/pidsumki-2022/

[19] https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extforth.aspx?memberkey1=993&category=forth&year=2011&trxtype=repchg&overforth=f&schedule=exp&extend=y

[20] file:///C:/Users/cooly/Downloads/urc2022_lugano-declaration.pdf; https://recovery.gov.ua/en

[21] https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/ukraine-estimates-cost-of-reconstruction-at-750-billion/

[22] calls its website https://privatization.gov.ua/ and that is a great insight into the ideological makeup of the people in charge of it.

[23] https://jacobin.com/2022/03/ukraine-cancel-foreign-debt-imf-economic-conditions

[24] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/reconstruction-ukraine-should-start-today-first-step-ukraines-safety